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About some limitations  
in researching the human being.  
Theological perspective
Any research on the human being has to be done in a very careful way. 
Since in this unique situation, the human being is both the object and 
subject of the study. We are not able to be fully objective toward the ob-
ject of the study because, naturally, we compare and apply the outcomes 
of such research to ourselves.
How a person is defined has gone through several stages of develop-
ment in the history of thought. In the classical tradition, a person is con-
sidered to be a substance. This is Boethius’s understanding of a person 
as “an individual substance of a rational nature.” In modernity, John 
Locke brought forward the notion that social existence and conscious-
ness are the most salient properties of a person, which generated a risk 
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of renouncing one’s personhood because of a lack of some perceivable 
and observable traits.
This is  why, in  Christian anthropology, there is  such an  emphasis 
on personalism, which from the very beginning of the 20th century has 
been opposed to the treatment of people as obscure elements of matter, 
or  elements to  be manipulated unquestioningly. The dominant tech-
no-pragmatic culture of our time, with its undisputed accomplishments, 
seems set to remain the highest authority on our nature and our aspira-
tions as persons. But we want to be considered as unique and valuable 
persons, and not simply elements of a large, complex social machine.
In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this has supported a terri-
ble phenomenon that has cost many people their lives: the cult of person-
ality. Using the most recent results of social psychology and the massive 
leverage available to some political systems, dictators have subjugated 
peoples and turned them against each other, to the detriment of human 
dignity.
Another type of threat to humanity, today, is the new and globalized 
society that has stripped people of their will, largely through their own 
consent. They have become involved with pleasure and competition 
in a variety of ways established by social convention or current fashion. 
Personalism should be seen as an antidote offered to the contemporary 
world, to help us preserve our uniqueness, dignity, and autonomy.
In this paper we will indicate some elements of anthropology that 
demonstrate the important limitation of any attempt at explaining away 
the mystery of being human person.
1. Theological personalism
To a large extent, contemporary humanity is frustrated, turned in-
wards, left alone and deprived of  subjectivity. Modern psychology 
doesn’t help us  to haul ourselves out of  this confined world or  give 
us spiritual maturity. The litmus test for such maturity is the capacity 
to engage in a deep and nurturing relationship with another person. 
The lack of spiritual maturity can be masked by activities that limit us to 
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the world of things, and when they vanish we are faced again with our 
loneliness.
To address this challenge existentialist personalism focuses on self-ac-
tualization. It agrees with the definition of a person offered by Boethi-
us. However, it fails to underline the communion expressed most fully 
in love. First initiated by existentialist philosophers, and further devel-
oped by psychologists, communion as expressed in love reflects on lib-
erty and personal responsibility in regard to one’s major choices, and 
testifies to the importance of becoming truly human. The encounter 
with another is often seen by existentialist thinkers more as a threat than 
an opportunity. While communitarian personalism also insists on the 
importance of individual freedom, it understands the need to connect 
with and take responsibility for another “Thou.” Without love, freedom 
can be destructive.
Many types of personalism have developed along with the world and 
its history, but first and foremost, in opposition to the nature and the 
role of the human body. They represent the temptation to escape into 
“spiritualism,” an overestimation of human spirituality. It is easy to illus-
trate and defend a privileged position for the human mind, flowing from 
human dignity in comparison with the entire world of nature. These 
types of personalism see our carnality with suspicion, viewing it as be-
ing in conflict with true spiritual existence. A more adequate concept 
of our existence is twofold: carnal and spiritual. It has to be the entire 
human being who loves and not simply the pure spirit. Though the hu-
man body can become the anchoring point for a materialist theory, it is 
nonetheless an element in the structure of the whole human being. The 
absolutization of the body is dangerous, but so too is the absolutization 
of the spirit. The body receives its personal dignity indirectly, being in-
strumental to developing interpersonal relationships, and consequently 
strengthening the community. The body enables the soul to express love 
in the full sense of its emotional energy; however, the body needs to be 
educated in a specific way.2
 2 B.  Häring, Personalismo in  teologia e  filosofia, Roma 1969, p.  41–42; A.  Jastrzęb-
ski, (Nie)obecność ciała w  wybranych koncepcjach psychologicznych i  filozoficznych, in: 
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Theologically speaking we know that the human being and God re-
veal themselves as  beings of  totally different natures. It  is not easy 
to  overcome such a  huge difference; to  establish a  relationship with 
God is a great challenge. Such a relationship is possible, however, since 
we share personhood with God. The belief in our personhood is the key 
to anthropology, since it reveals our immateriality. Otherwise, it would 
be difficult to explain the undeniable quest for “something more” some-
thing beyond our known reality.
Ultimately, theological personalism reveals our true personal nature, 
that of others, and of God. It unites these three into one indissoluble 
whole. For God is not only the creator of the world, and of ourselves, but 
also a loving friend.
Contemporary personalism has been under constant threat from in-
strumentalism – be it social or scientific – in the undisguised tendency 
to control reality with more and more inventions and increasingly effi-
cient tools.3
2. The dimension of the encounter
To get to know another human being, one needs to possess a capacity 
for sympathy that is just the reverse of the trend towards objectivization 
in contemporary science. Sympathy implies the acceptance of the other 
as someone who always transmits some message.4 Sympathy is another 
important characteristic of a solid anthropology.
The sympathetic discovery of another person occurs only in a rela-
tionship, as the discovery of another “Thou.” We meet our self as a living 
person in an authentic encounter with a “Thou.”5 According to Martin 
Buber, a major flaw of contemporary anthropology lies in the exacerba-
Człowiek  – Medycyna  – Wartości, red. E.  Starzyńska-Kościuszko, A.  Kucner, Olsztyn 2014, 
p. 195–210.
 3 B. Häring, Personalismo in teologia e filosofia, op. cit., p. 11.
 4 M. Buber, I and Thou, transl. W. A. Kaufmann, New York 1970.
 5 M. Buber, Eclipse of God: Studies in the Relation Between Religion and Philosophy, Atlantic 
Highland 1988, p. 44–45.
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tion of individuality. As a result, we’ve lost sight of the complete picture 
of selves. Buber opposes the practice of breaking a person down into 
parts and investigating the parts separately. This gives us the wrong idea 
of our nature. Openness to an encounter, to meeting another, then, is of 
the utmost importance.
The human being is not exclusively a self nor do we possess a self, 
but, as subjects of experience, we escape all forms of objectification. 
The self exists in relation to other selves and to objects – the first type 
of relationship implies openness to another’s existence while the second 
is closed to another self. Since we’re always moving between these two 
types of relationship, with persons and with objects, we are continually 
in statu fieri (being in the process of accomplishment). But those who respond 
to the meaning and life of  the world take responsibility both for the 
world and for themselves. They reject the temptation of indifference, 
of reifying the other. Indifference comes with being “outside” of the oth-
er’s life without any commitment to the fate of the other. A person can-
not be solely in a relationship with objects (I-it). Being caught up in the 
order of objects makes it impossible to become truly human. Full human 
development is only possible with the courage to reach out to another 
self, the courage of encounter.
Among the most important problems of our contemporary world, how-
ever, is alienation, the inability to connect with others. Throughout our 
lives we define ourselves by the way we enter into dialog with other, sim-
ilar or different people, the created world, and providence. Often dialog 
with others or with the world gives us no accessible and precise definition 
of ourselves and we are left with fragments. Indeed, if I can try to ex-
press what the most harmful situation a human person can be subjected 
to, it must be what prevents them from encountering another person 
in an authentic relationship. An authentic relationship between people 
depends on their viewing each other as having the same, ultimate value.
To develop a good understanding of ourselves, we have to consider the 
categories of dialog and the “I-Thou” relationship. Properly understood 
dialogism (not solipsism) leads to the act of self-transcendence that takes 
us beyond ourselves. And for this, I and Thou must both be unique. Genu-
ine encounter is not the meeting of two identical monads, but a sharing 
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of sense and meaning. This means a sincere reciprocal attention, tran-
scending people’s “ontological deafness” – their inability to listen to one 
another.6
The full discovery of our identity takes place through contacts with 
other persons. In  more concrete terms, it  starts with the encounter 
of another person and with the acknowledgement of this person as a gift. 
This is the real basis of individual freedom. Beyond contacts with other 
persons, the encounter with God as a person is of crucial importance. 
Entering into a profound relationship with God often leads to a trans-
formation of one’s life, and to the experience of infinite love. In fact, the 
most profound experience a person can have occurs in and through love, 
because it is the best way to encounter another “Thou”.
Buber says that someone is a person only because surrounded by oth-
ers similar to  themselves.7 The existentialist psychologist van Kaam 
would say that “every encounter, makes the other be in some way. The 
way in which I make the other be is very much determined by the kind 
of encounter we have.”8
Van Kaam goes further:
It is totally impossible for me to think about any mode of being in which I am 
perfectly alone. All my modes of being in the world are influenced by the existence 
of others. Others make me be, and I make others be. The reality which I am is not 
an isolated reality independent of others. I can only understand myself as born 
from the other, or as nourished and educated by the other, as speaking the lan-
guage the other speaks, as wearing clothing that is created by others, or as having 
customs generated by many others before me.9
The point for van Kaam is that each of us must stay in open dialog 
with reality. This dialog would mean being open to the world as it reveals 
itself in our daily circumstances. Otherwise, the lack of such dialog would 
 6 V. E. Frankl, The Will to Meaning. Foundations and Applications of Logotherapy, New York 
1988, p. 89.
 7 M. Buber, The Writings of Martin Buber. Selected, edited, and translated by Will Herberg, 
New York 1956, p. 63–88; M. Theunissen, Personalismus, in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philo-
sophie, Hrsg. J. Ritter, K. Gründer, Bd. 7, Basel 1989, p. 339.
 8 A. Van Kamm, The Art of Existential Counseling, Pennsylvania 1966, p. 46.
 9 A. Van Kamm, The Art of Existential Counseling, op. cit., p. 48.
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close us off from reality – a rejection of its voice, which is ultimately the 
voice of truth.10
Similarly, Rollo May insists on the need for dialogism in human exist-
ence, saying that the authentic encounter with another person always 
drastically reorganizes the world of our relationships as well as our com-
fortable, quiet lives, and leads to the issue of our openness and readiness 
for change.11 Paul Tillich adds that being a person means questioning our 
own existence and living according to the answers we give.12
To summarise, let us turn to Wilfrid Stinissen who postulates that 
we discover ourselves only when we can see ourselves in the loving eyes 
of another person. It is very difficult to get to know ourselves while living 
alone.13 Hence, the dimension of encounter is another major point for 
anthropological reflection.
3. Against determinism in understanding the human being
We propose to acknowledge Victor Frankl’s concept of multidimen-
sionality as an important characteristic of an anthropology that is self-
aware of its limitations. Frankl considered that, compared with science, 
philosophy is the only discipline capable of providing a complete ac-
count of human existence. We are also aware that the ultimate, yet not 
definitive, understanding of  the human being comes from theology. 
Frankl underlines that the natural sciences offer only very specific, thus 
limited account of their understanding of the human being, dooming 
their research to a certain failure. Even though they pretend to produce 
a full vision of our existence, their outcome invariably leads to reduc-
tive accounts – an organism, a mechanism, or a process of socialization. 
Frankl is emphatic on this common tendency in the sciences, while ac-
knowledging their contribution to knowledge.
 10 A. Van Kamm, The Art of Existential Counseling, op. cit., p. 73.
 11 R. May, The Emergence of Existential Psychology, in: Existential Psychology, ed. R. May, New 
York 1961, p. 40.
 12 P. Tillich, Pytanie o Nieuwarunkowane, przekł. J. Zychowicz, Kraków 1994, p. 81.
 13 W. Stinissen, Człowiek prawdziwy, przekł. J. Iwaszkiewicz, Poznań 2013, p. 80.
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To illustrated this challenge Frankl has conducted a quite interesting, 
philosophical analysis of human existence that has greatly surpassed 
the other accomplishments of psychology. It is sometimes called “me-
ta-clinical analysis.” His vision of the human being offers a more com-
prehensive account of our existence than psychology. Philosophy can 
help psychology in the task of establishing and improving standards for 
the study of human nature.
To better present his concept of the human being, Frankl sets out two 
laws of what he called “dimensional ontology.”14 He explains the first 
law of dimensional ontology as follows: when we project from a cylinder 
onto two flat planes facing the top and the side, we get a two-dimen-
sional circle on one of these planes and a rectangle on the other. This 
enables us to understand the highly specialized nature of contemporary 
science. We have two distinct pictures, yet both are true. To integrate 
these two aspects into a  more adequate concept of  human existence 
we need to climb over them and reach a higher level and see everything 
in a much larger perspective, as we do in philosophy as well as in the-
ology. Consistent with the second law of  dimensional ontology, three 
different solid figures look alike when projected from the base onto 
a single two-dimensional plane: a cylinder, a cone, and a ball all appear 
as a two-dimensional circle. In this way Frankl explains the incapacity 
of  the sciences within the scope of  their own standards and practic-
es to  consider all aspects of  the human being. As  an example, Frankl 
indicates religion: on a psychological plane, it  is reduced to a psychic 
phenomenon.
The fragmentary scientific concepts of human existence – such as be-
haviourism, psychoanalysis, or Pavlovian conditioning – represent lower, 
two-dimensional levels of description. Even if they do not stand in op-
position to the holistic concept, they cannot provide an account of the 
wholeness of human existence. Only a three-dimensional concept of the 
human being provides a complete picture.15
 14 V. E. Frankl, The Will to Meaning, op. cit., p. 23.
 15 V. E. Frankl, The Will to Meaning, op. cit., p. 26.
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The significance of the second law of dimensional ontology can be il-
lustrated with the example of neurosis. According to Frankl, this pathol-
ogy can have several sources, several aetiologies. There are, for instance, 
psychogenic neurosis, somatogenic neurosis, and noogenic neurosis. The 
latter is Frankl’s contribution to understanding neurosis, which, in his 
eyes, is a spiritual neurosis linked to the losing of life’s meaning. Frankl 
relates it to spiritual problems, moral conflicts, and problems concerning 
the meaning of life expressed through the need to overcome existential 
emptiness.16 Opting for a two-dimensional or a unidimensional approach 
to human suffering impacts negatively on our dignity as human beings. 
For instance, the mechanical model of the human being treats us as ob-
jects to be fixed, and not as self-conscious subjects of experience nor 
beings capable of discovering meaning.17
The significance of the second law of dimensional ontology can be il-
lustrated with reference to  Joan of  Arc. Keeping in  mind the voices 
she heard and the frequent hallucinations she had, it would be possi-
ble to diagnose the saint as a clear case of  schizophrenia. Only from 
a three-dimensional perspective, can we see her real meaning in history 
and theology. In this perspective, Joan of Arc appears with a much larger 
stature than that of a schizophrenic.18 Another example can be found 
in St. Theresa of Lisieux, who, despite her suffering from Separation 
Anxiety Disorder, was able to develop a sound spiritual life.19
A higher level of description obviously allows a better view of  re-
ality because it contains in itself the lower levels. We obtain a better 
account of the lower level from the higher one, in which the former re-
mains somewhat hidden. From this standpoint, we can say that biology 
is better explained by psychology, psychology by noology, and noology 
by theology.20
 16 V. E. Frankl, The Will to Meaning, op. cit., p. 27.
 17 V. E. Frankl, The Will to Meaning, op. cit., p. 28.
 18 V. E. Frankl, The Will to Meaning, op. cit., p. 29.
 19 P. C. Vitz, C. P. Lynch, Thérèse of Lisieux From the Perspective of Attachment Theory and 
Separation Anxiety, “The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion” 17/1 (2007), 
p. 61–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10508610709336854.
 20 V. E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Ultimate Meaning, New York 2000, p. 16.
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4. Cataphatic-apophatic dimension of anthropology
The last point regarding the limits of  any anthropology is  that 
there will be always a space of unknown regarding the human being. 
Awareness of  this fact was more present in  the early years of  the 
church. Athanasius of Alexandria, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and oth-
er fathers of the church tried to purify the theology of the Hellenistic 
tradition. While doing this, they developed a  Christian apophaticism 
that aimed to  turn speculative thinking towards the contemplation 
of the mystery of the Holy Trinity. In apophatic theology, God remains 
hidden – Deus absconditus.21 As the image of God, the deepest nucleus 
of our existence, our spiritual existence, likewise remains hidden to us. 
Thus, we  can speak, analogously, of  homo absconditus or  of apophatic 
anthropology.22
St. Augustine opposed the attempt to define our nature, because every 
such attempt is inevitably fraught with the risk of reductionism, be it 
by oversimplification or through the neglect of constitutive elements. 
We cannot describe our personal nature from the outside with the help 
of Aristotelian categories. Augustine says that such a procedure leaves 
no room for mystery; we should turn to God in order to understand our 
nature “without any eclipse”.23
Gabriel Marcel elaborated on this point as follows:
If this is so, it must be seen that the personality cannot in any way be compared 
to an object of which we can say it is there, in other words that it is given, present 
before our eyes, that it is part of a collation of things which can, of their essence, 
be counted, or again, that it is a statistical unit which can be noted in the cal-
culations of a sociologist employing the methods of an engineer. Or again, if we 
no longer consider things from outside but from within, that is to say from the 
point of view of the person himself, it does not seem that strictly speaking he can 
say “I am” of himself. He is aware of himself far less as a being than as a desire 
 21 V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, transl. Fellowship of St. Alban 
and St. Sergius, London 1957, p. 50.
 22 P. Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, transl. A. P. Gythiel, Crestwood 
1994, p. 44.
 23 St. Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, transl. and annoted by J. G. Pilkington, 
New York 1943, p. 80–82.
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to rise above everything which he is and is not, above the actuality in which he re-
ally feels he is involved and has part to play, but which does not satisfy him, for 
it falls short of the aspiration with which he identifies himself.24
For Marcel, as for Augustine, the human being remains a mystery. This 
does not mean that we cannot know ourselves, but rather that there 
always looms the possibility of “degrading” the mystery of our exist-
ence or of transforming it into a “problem,” a problem to be resolved 
by our own efforts. Marcel sees this as a fault of contemporary academic 
mentality.25
With our science we do not create values, but we revive and embody 
them. Through our subjective experience, we seem to shape ourselves, 
that is, we seem to establish our personal values, but, from an onto-
logical point of view, they were ours from the very beginning. We can 
only expand on this knowledge. We are, as we suggested earlier, homo 
absconditus. Only the discovery of the revealed truth about our nature 
allows us to live more fully.26 The cataphatic side of Christian anthropol-
ogy, where we assert something, has to coexist with an apophatic side 
that admits the mystery.
Conclusion
We can point to an artificial division of the ontological and episte-
mological orders. Let us explain. Left to ourselves and being at the same 
time the inquirer and the object of inquiry, we do not have the necessary 
distance for scientific objectivity in regard to ourselves. This explains 
why it is so easy to make serious mistakes concerning the understand-
ing of our existence and, consequently, the human being generally. Only 
a superior spiritual being could take a  fully objective view of human 
nature – and here we are referring specifically to God. A distant echo 
of the difficulty we have of getting to know our true nature is  found 
 24 G. Marcel, Homo Viator, transl. E. Craufurd, London 1951, p. 25–26.
 25 G. Marcel, Being and Having, transl. K. Farrer, London 1965, p. 185–189.
 26 P. Evdokimov, Woman and the Salvation of the World, op. cit., p. 49.
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in Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy. As we cannot in the same 
moment know the location and the speed of an electron, so we cannot 
know at once the pure self (like Husserl) and its content. We are, like-
wise, an enigma to ourselves, as it is in our nature to be witness both 
to the whole world and to our relationship to it. By itself, our existence 
is a good illustration of the discontinuities and of the incompleteness 
of the world of nature where we are directed to a higher reality than our-
selves. Since we are thus related to two different orders – the ontological 
and epistemological – we have the ability to self-transcend, but without 
theological knowledge, it only makes us a paradoxical entity, full of inner 
contradictions and of conflicts between several tendencies.
We know from experience that the human person can be both com-
passionate and cruel, clever and stupid, just and greedy, free and unfree. 
We possess a distorted nature but we have also a memory of our divine 
origins, because our roots are in God, and we are advancing towards God 
more or less consciously. As humans, we are not exclusively a by-product 
of blind natural forces, and we remain part of nature. We are still linked 
to some biological determinism, despite the fact that we can transform 
or bypass it. In our actions we become creators, creators of nature, crea-
tors of culture and of a new value in the natural world, which is why it is 
impossible to solve the problem of our nature by relating it solely to the 
results of natural science, without any relationship to God. We cannot 
understand ourselves with reference only to something “lower.” The hu-
man being is the imago Dei, both as a fallen and as a ransomed creature.
Any well-grounded anthropology must limit itself in regard to the 
mystery of the human being, mysterium personae. However, theological 
anthropology illuminates, complements, and accurately identifies the 
humanist intuitions concerning human nature, in  the final analysis 
every anthropology remains at the threshold of the mystery of the hu-
man being. Ignoramus et ignorabimus. This human fallibility indicates that 
the other can be right, and this leads to humility.
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Summary
About some limitations in researching the human being.  
Theological perspective
The concept of a person has gone through several stages of development in the 
history of thought. In the classical tradition, a person is considered to be a substance. 
In  modernity, John Locke brought forward the notion that social existence and 
consciousness are the most salient properties of a person, which brought about 
a possibility of renouncing one’s personhood because of a lack of some perceivable 
and observable traits. This is  why in  a  Christian anthropology there is  such 
an  emphasis on  personalism, which from the very beginning of  the twentieth 
century has been opposed to the treatment of people as obscure elements of matter, 
or elements be manipulated unquestioningly. In this paper we have indicated some 
elements of anthropology that demonstrate important limitation of any attempt 
at explaining away the mystery of being a human person.
Keywords: human person, personalism, determinism, mystery
O granicach w badaniu człowieka. Perspektywa teologiczna
Pojęcie osoby przeszło wiele zmian w  historii myśli ludzkiej. W  tradycji 
klasycznej osoba jest uważana za substancję. W oświeceniu John Locke przedstawił 
pogląd, że egzystencja społeczna i świadomość są najważniejszymi właściwościami 
osoby, co spowodowało możliwość utracenia godności osobowej z powodu braku 
pewnych dostrzegalnych i  możliwych do  zaobserwowania cech. Właśnie dlatego 
w antropologii chrześcijańskiej kładzie się tak duży nacisk na personalizm, który 
od  samego początku stanowi przeciwwagę wobec traktowania ludzi li  tylko jako 
elementów materii, którymi można dowolnie manipulować. W niniejszym artykule 
przedstawimy taką charakterystykę antropologii, która ukazuje istotne ograniczenie 
wszelkich prób wyjaśnienia tajemnicy bycia człowiekiem.
Słowa kluczowe: osoba ludzka, personalizm, determinizm, mysterium
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